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Introduction
"Grounding is something like metaphysical causation." S c h a f f e r ( 2 0 1 2 ) p . 1 2 2 "Ground, if you like, stands to philosophy as cause stands to science." F i n e ( 2 0 1 2 ) p . 4 0 "I offer a treatment of grounding in the image of causation... " S c h a f f e r ( 2 0 1 6 ) p . 9 6
In the quotes above, I think Jonathan Schaffer and Kit Fine have understated the intimacy of the connection between grounding and causation. The thesis of the present paper is that grounding just is a type of causation: metaphysical causation. I will refer to this claim as G=MC. According to G=MC, the grounding relation 1 is a special case of the causal relation: whenever A grounds B, A is a (metaphysical)
cause of B and B is a (metaphysical) effect of A. Grounding is a way of causing.
1 Perhaps neither grounding nor causation is strictly speaking relational, but is instead best expressed with something like a sentence operator; see Fine 2012 . This issue is orthogonal to my argument.
Making sense of G=MC requires us to draw a contrast between metaphysical causation and non-metaphysical causation-or, to coin a term, nomological causation. As I conceive it, this contrast is between two different ways in which the causal sufficiency relation can hold. If an instance of the causal sufficiency relation is mediated by a law of nature, then it is an instance of nomological causation. If an instance of the causal sufficiency relation is not mediated by any law of nature, then it is an instance of metaphysical causation. That the throwing of the stone is a sufficient cause of the breaking of the window is mediated by the laws of nature; but
that the existence of Socrates is a sufficient cause of the existence of Singleton
Socrates is not mediated by any law of nature. I characterize the notion of mediation in §5, in terms of the structural-equations framework I will present. Beyond that notion, the proposed distinction between types of causation relies only on the notion of a law of nature, to which most metaphysicians are independently committed.
2
Assuming that we antecedently understand lawhood, we have in hand everything we need in order to demarcate cases of grounding from cases of nomological causation.
Why think that grounding is metaphysical causation?-because of the theoretical unity and simplicity that ensues. G=MC has two major theoretical benefits:
 G=MC is ideologically parsimonious. If grounding is just metaphysical causation, then we do not need a separate theory of grounding invoking new primitive notions. Instead, our theory of grounding will invoke only whatever fundamental ideology is employed by our best theory of causation in general, in addition to the notion of a law of nature.
3
 G=MC accounts in a straightforward way for the explanatory nature of grounding claims: grounding explanations are a type of causal explanation, and they work by identifying metaphysical causes. G=MC thereby supports a compelling unified theory of explanation, undermining counterexamples to the appealingly simple view (defended inter alia by Railton 1981 , Lewis 1986c and Skow 2014) that all explanations are causal explanations.
Contemporary metaphysicians typically adopt a Quinean methodology of comparing total theories, or ʻsystems of the worldʼ as Quine (1975) puts it. Given such a methodology, the having of a theoretical benefit can count in favour of a principle of fundamental metaphysics. The theoretical benefits described above can accordingly form the basis of a prima facie case for G=MC.
2 For a closely related application of lawhood, see Hale & Leech (forthcoming) . 3 In this respect, my proposal resembles those of J. Wilson (2014) and Hofweber (2009) , who argue that grounding claims can and should be accommodated using antecedently-understood ideology such as counterfactual dependence, logical consequence or conceptual inclusion. My version of their approach requires only counterfactual dependence and laws of nature.
The argument from theoretical virtue is not conclusive. To reinforce the case for G=MC, we need independent reasons to think that grounding has important features in common with more familiar forms of causation. Such reasons can be found in the systematic analogy between grounding and nomological causation, which is explored in §2-6 of this paper. Strikingly many of the important features of causal ideology apply across both nomological causation and grounding, and in comparison to the extensive commonalities between nomological causation and grounding, the residual differences between them look insignificant. The relations of grounding and of nomological causation have the same logical properties (which can be challenged in structurally analogous ways); the relations have the same connections to explanation and to counterfactuals; the same puzzle cases and theoretical issues arise when we try to give the relations a counterfactual analysis; and popular interventionist treatments of nomological causation carry smoothly over to grounding. The best explanation of these persistent parallels is that grounding and nomological causation are different ways for a generalized causal relation to obtain 4 .
According to G=MC, metaphysical causation and nomological causation are different species of the same genus. This is something that my proposal has in common with a type of dualistic position defended by a number of recent authors.
According to Jonathan Schaffer, the relations of grounding and causation are both species of the genus directed determination relation; and according to Karen Bennett, they are both species of the genus building relation. It is tempting to dismiss my dispute with such authors as merely terminological: for example, we could simply translate their term ʻdirected determinationʼ by my term ʻcausationʼ, and their term ʻcausationʼ by my term ʻnomological causationʼ. But there is more to the dispute than choice of terminology: where I posit a single primitive, Bennett and Schaffer posit two distinct primitives neither of which is reducible to the other. Thus their view ultimately has more in common with the views of authors like Fine (2012) and Koslicki (2015) who treat ground and cause as fully distinct fundamental notions. Of course, ideological parsimony is a notoriously vexed methodological principle (see e.g. Quine 1968 , Lowe 2006 ; in what follows, I invite you temporarily to suspend any doubts about it and to take seriously the ideological parsimony argument for G=MC.
4 Some of these parallels are also noted by Schaffer (2012 Schaffer ( , 2015 . The conclusion of the present paper, which was written before Schaffer (2016) became available, is significantly stronger than Schafferʼs: I develop the structural-equations approach to grounding in service of my main argument that grounding is a type of causation, whereas Schafferʼs aim is the more modest one of providing a tractable formal model for grounding. J. Wilson (2016) , which was also written subsequently to the present paper, offers a reply to the argument from the grounding-causation analogy to grounding-causation unity.
For those who remain uncomfortable with my terminological preferences, I can offer alternatives. Instead of using 'causation' for the genus-level term and 'metaphysical causation' and 'nomological causation' for the species, we could use 'objective explanation' for the genus and 'grounding' and 'causation' for the species.
Then P grounds Q iff P objectively explains Q and this explanatory fact is not itself objectively explained by any law of nature; and P causes Q iff P objectively explains Q and this explanatory fact is objectively explained by some law of nature. But nothing much rests on this terminological choice. In the present paper I will continue to use 'causation' to refer to the genus, on the basis that labelling grounding as metaphysical causation emphasizes our prior conceptual familiarity with the notion.
Some signposting is in order. §2 locates the target of the analysis-the grounding relation-and sets out the systematic analogy between grounding and causation. §3 identifies some core examples on which to test G=MC. In §4, I explore the fate of key counterfactuals associated with metaphysical causal dependence, and discuss some apparent difficulties facing counterfactual accounts of grounding. I argue that these problems are familiar from the metaphysics of causation and that they can readily be handled by sophisticated counterfactual accounts of causal dependence.
One interesting approach of this kind, interventionism, essentially involves the use of structural-equation models; in §5 I present a number of grounding models that are analogues of problem cases familiar from the causation literature. §6 discusses how these grounding models should be understood, and proposes a classification scheme for varieties of causation in terms of the source of the dependency. §7 concludes by summarizing the case for G=MC.
Grounding and Causation
First we need to get clear on exactly which notion of ground our analysis is targeting. In this paper we will be solely concerned with the notion of strict ground, (Schaffer 2005) . Interventionism, to be discussed in detail in §5-6, allows for the possibility of transitivity failures both for metaphysical causation and for nomological causation, while also letting us specify conditions under which causal relations will be transitive (Woodward 2003, p.79-81) .
5 As far as I am aware, Nancy Cartwright was the first to draw attention to this type of example (in Cartwright 1979) . 6 A referee suggests that Schaffer's counterexample is less persuasive than Hall's, since it is less obvious that the dent does not ground the ball's being roundish than it is that the falling rock does not cause the hiker's survival. I agree with the referee on the relative strength of judgments here, but what is important for present purposes is the structural similarity of the proposed counterexamples. My own diagnosis of the relative strength of these cases turns on how strongly the supposed cause threatens the supposed effect; something's posing a threat to an event tends to undermine that thing as a candidate cause of that event. Given the setup of the cases, it's easy to imagine that the boulder posed a serious threat to the hiker's survival, but hard to imagine that the dent posed a serious threat to the near-sphericality of the dented object. There's accordingly more pressure to deny that the boulder falling is a cause of the survival than there is pressure to deny that the dent is a ground of the near-sphericality. where the truth-value of each sentence is plausibly (via the principle that the fact that 'P' is true is grounded in the fact that P) fully grounded in the truth-value of the other sentence:
Again, the same sorts of response to these challenges to asymmetry are available in the causation and grounding cases. Probably the most popular responses will be either both to reject all putative cases of symmetric causation and to reject all putative cases of symmetric grounding, or to endorse asymmetry for each notion only when restricted to some more specific subject-matters. Neither of these responses represents any particular threat to G=MC. 7 Barnes formulates her arguments in terms of ontological dependence rather than of grounding, but many grounding theorists think of cases of ontological dependence as instances of ground. 8 The sentences are either both true or both false; it's an interesting question which truthvalues they have (and why) but not one that we need to address for present purposes. As a referee points out, this case also threatens either transitivity or irreflexivity; those who think grounding is non-symmetric rather than asymmetric must choose their poison. Logical considerations only take us so far in understanding grounding.
(Divisibility is a partial order on the natural numbers, but it is not the same relation as grounding.) Our grip on grounding is supposed to come in two other main ways:
through examples, and through the connection with explanation. Nomological causation and grounding stand in the same distinctive relation to our practice of explanation: nomological causal relations and relations of ground each figure in explanations, without being literally identical to those explanations. When we want to explain why the bottle broke, we cite the nomological causes of its breaking; and when we want to explain why Singleton Socrates exists, we cite the existence of
Socrates. This sort of distinction between causation and causal explanation is familiar from the philosophy of science, and it carries straight over to grounding.
As Schaffer (2016) points out, nomological causation and grounding also bear similar relations to a range of metaphysical notions connected with explanation.
First, to laws: we naturally think of particular cases of grounding as supported by general metaphysical principles, analogously to how particular cases of nomological causation are supported by general laws of nature. Second, to modality: Schaffer (2016, fn.5) endorses a global supervenience principle of effects/grounded facts on causes/grounding facts for both (deterministic) nomological causation and grounding.
Third, to inference: under the right conditions we can be justified in inferring the effect/grounded fact from the cause/grounding fact. Putting all this together, the connection with explanation provides a striking further parallel between nomological causation and grounding.
A final-and rather more nebulous-point of analogy between grounding and nomological causation concerns their methodological status. Both notions have historically attracted suspicion from philosophers with empiricist inclinations:
consider Humeʼs argument that causation cannot be perceived (Hume 1748) , Lewisʼs campaign to account for everything in the scientific and manifest image in terms of his doctrine of Humean Supervenience (Lewis 1986a) , Siderʼs affirmation that "as a
Humean Iʼm suspicious of metaphysical pushings and pullings" (Sider 2011 p.145) and Dalyʼs recent arguments that the notion of grounding is ʻunintelligibleʼ or ʻobscureʼ because it cannot be characterized in independent terms (Daly 2012 ).
Relations of cause and ground are thought to lack clear content exactly insofar as they go beyond the uncontroversial notions (constant conjunction, supervenience) that they are supposed to explain. Here is not the place to properly evaluate this line of thought, although A. Wilson (forthcoming) explores one way in which it could be developed; it will suffice for present purposes to note that it further extends the analogy between grounding and nomological causation.
Thus far we have found nothing of consequence to distinguish nomological causation from grounding: they have the same general logical features, they come in analogous flavours, and they bear the same general connections to explanation. Of course, the analogy does not go on forever: the differences in what nomological causation and grounding depend upon gives rise to some differences between nomological causation and grounding down the line. I will discuss three disanalogies between them, which arise from their different relationships with the temporal ordering of events, with the notion of causal production, and with the notion of fundamentality.
The most obvious disanalogy between grounding and nomological causation is that grounding is usually synchronic (it relates facts about some time t to further facts about t) while causation is usually diachronic (it relates facts about some earlier time t 1 to facts about some later time t 2 .) However, I think that this difference does not run deep; some nomological causal relations may be synchronic and some grounding relations may be diachronic 9 . For example, if consistent time travel is possible then a time-traveller's pressing a button at t to travel back in time and present their former self with a freshly-printed set of time-machine blueprints may be a cause of another event that also occurs at t: the existence of some well-used and dog-eared blueprints. And any cases of gravitational or quantum action at a distance would (at least on some interpretations) count as synchronic causation. Conversely, another, it is then to be expected that nomological causal dependencies should by and large be diachronic. And since metaphysical causal dependencies are not mediated by any laws of nature (instead being mediated by principles of logic or metaphysics that do not typically impose diachronic constraints) it is to be expected that metaphysical causal dependencies should by and large be synchronic.
Nomological causation and grounding also appear to differ in their relationship with concrete dynamical processes. Nomological causation is widely assumed to have a special relationship with concrete physical processes which transfer marks, or massenergy, or some other conserved physical quantity. Sometimes this relationship is exploited to construct a full-fledged theory of causation, for example by Fair (1979) , Salmon (1984) and Dowe (1992) . But even defenders of alternative counterfactual or probabilistic approaches to causation are likely to agree that nomological causation stands in some special relationship to concrete physical processes, while grounding does not. This is exactly as would be predicted by my proposal for demarcating nomological causation from metaphysical causation. Since nomological causal dependencies are mediated by laws of nature while metaphysical causal dependencies do not, it is entirely unsurprising that claims about actual nomological causal dependencies have consequences for actual law-governed natural processes while claims about actual metaphysical causal dependencies have no such consequences. 9 For discussion of more examples of these sorts, see (Wilson MS) .
While some conceptions of the special relationship between causation and physical processes might be inimical to G=MC, there is a widespread and popular conception of this relationship that is fully congenial to G=MC. That is the dualistic view defended by Hall (2004) , who argues that we have two basic and different notions of causation: causal production and causal dependence. Causal dependence is a matter of the right patterns of counterfactuals; causal production is a distinctively dynamical way that causal dependence might obtain. Crucially, though, there are other ways that causal dependence might obtain; dependence need not go via production. Hall motivates this distinction by appeal to cases of causation by absence and cases of double prevention (see §5); it is also a natural fit for friends of G=MC.
Cases of metaphysical causation are amongst those cases in which causal dependence does not go via causal production.
Grounding is also thought to have a special connection to fundamentality: a grounding fact is supposed to be more fundamental than any facts it grounds, and something is fundamental iff it is ungrounded (Bennett forthcoming). Nomological causation is not usually seen as connected to fundamentality in this way (although Part of the orthodox view of ground is grounding necessitarianism: the principle that full grounds necessitate the facts they ground. While this is a standard principle of ground, validated within the systems of e.g. Fine and Schaffer, it has been challenged by a number of authors. Leuenberger (2014) and Skiles (2015) have argued directly against it. Parsons (1999) and Briggs (2012b) have argued that the relation of truthmaking does not entail the corresponding strict conditional; so if truthmaking is a kind of full grounding then these authors deny that full grounds always necessitate. For the purposes of this paper, I can remain neutral on grounding necessitarianism. Still, it is plausible that full grounds at least sometimes necessitate the facts they ground, while sufficient nomological causes at least sometimes do not.
Fortunately, this distinction between metaphysical causation and nomological causation is predicted by G=MC in conjunction with the demarcation criterion proposed above. Given the widespread assumption that laws of nature are metaphysically contingent, then a failure of necessitation for nomological causation is just what we should expect; if an instance of a dependency relation is mediated by a contingent fact, then there is no barrier to the possibility of the cause obtaining without the effect obtaining. Instances of metaphysical causation in contrast are not typically mediated by any contingent fact; it is then entirely to be expected that the grounding fact necessitates the grounded fact.
Cases of Metaphysical Causation
Further explication of grounding tends to go by way of example, and the recent literature contains a rich and diverse diet of cases. Here is a representative sample:
Singleton: The existence of Socrates grounds the existence of singleton Socrates.
Double-negation:
The truth of P grounds the truth of ¬¬P.
Disjunction:
The truth of P grounds the truth of P⋁Q.
Conjunction:
The truth of P grounds the truth of P&Q.
Truthmaking:
The existence of Socrates grounds the truth of ʻSocrates existsʼ. Euthyphro: Godʼs desiring that P grounds its being good that P.
Mind
Noether: The symmetry of the laws of nature under time-translation grounds the fact that energy is a conserved quantity. (Lewis 1986b) . But as I see it, the primary motivation for thinking that abstract objects are acausal is that abstract objects fail to engage in the kinds of activity which can sustain causal production (see p.11). Abstracta do not have mass or couple to quantum fields. Will we then propose new dynamical theories for abstract objects, positing metaphysical forces between them, to sustain metaphysical causation? No; a parallel physics of abstracta is a bad plan. But we can do full justice to this thought via a prohibition on abstract causal production, while still allowing for abstract causal dependence.
Causal dependence need not rest on any productive connection between cause and effect: a classic example of this is causation by omission. But more generally, we can go along with Hall's denial that dependence need go via production, and interpret G=MC accordingly: we identify grounding with metaphysical causal dependence rather than with metaphysical causal production. 11 Metaphysical causation need not involve any form of causal production-no metaphysical 'biff'!-but it does need to involve characteristically causal patterns of counterfactual dependence.
10 Versions of this argument could be run with respect to specific kinds of abstract objects (such as sets), or with respect to some characteristic feature of some abstract objects (such as lack of spatial location). My response will also apply to these variant arguments. 11 This response could alternatively be made out by appeal to a flavour of causal pluralism other than Hall's: see, for example, Sober (1985) , Hitchcock (2003) , Cartwright (2004) , Psillos (2009 ), Godfrey-Smith (2010 , Strevens (2013) .
It is also worth noting that causation simpliciter is often not seen as restricted to causation amongst concreta; for example, God's act of bringing the world into existence (and time along with it) is pretty widely taken to be a potential case of causation, even though it is not obviously a case of causation amongst concreta.
Likewise, a restriction of 'causation' to refer to causation amongst concreta would render Amie Thomasson's influential defence 12 of the view that works of art are created abstract objects (as well as the Cartesian dualist view that minds are nonconcrete objects with causal powers) as just conceptually or linguistically confused.
However, I don't need to rest too much on the conceptual coherence of any particular cases of causation involving abstracta. What I am arguing is that the general notion of causal dependence is conceptually separable from its particular application to concrete objects, events, and states of affairs.
These various manoeuvres may seem to miss the point. Doesn't intuition tell us directly that grounding is not a type of causation? A distinguished anticipation of this objection can be found in Kim (1973) , who influentially criticized Lewisʼs theory of causation for not adequately distinguishing counterfactual dependence in virtue of causation from counterfactual dependence in virtue of two events overlapping and hence sharing a common part. Kim took it to be intuitively obvious that counterfactual dependencies deriving from overlap should not count as causation.
Other similar objections maintain that it is intuitively obvious that causation must hold between events at different times, or between events with spatial extension.
Objections from direct intuition can be resisted either by denying the evidential (Shoemaker 1980 (Shoemaker , 1998 and Robert Williams on gunk (Williams 2006) . Both strategies seem applicable to our intuitions concerning grounding and causation. We could maintain that the relevant issues are simply too highly theoretical and abstract for intuition to carry weight: nothing in our evolutionary history, one might argue, has adapted us to be accurate in our intuitions about fundamental ideological notions within metaphysics. Alternatively, we can offer nomological causation-the type of causal dependencies that themselves depend on the laws of nature-as the source of our problematic intuitions, saying that we mistake intuitions about nomological causation for intuitions about causation in general. Such a mistake might be unsurprising, given the prominence of nomological causation in our everyday lives.
One way of pushing the challenge from intuition would be to insist that the term 'causation', as it is generally used, analytically excludes cases of grounding. If this is so, then defenders of G=MC are simply misunderstanding the terms they use. But this is a dangerous line of thought: it threatens to make taxonomic progress in science impossible. Compare: if everyone believes that all dinosaurs were in fact scaly lizard-like things, then everyone will be inclined to take the extension of 'dinosaurs'
as it occurs in "birds are a type of dinosaur" to include only scaly lizard-like things.
But we should not conclude that the hypothesis that birds are a type of dinosaur is confused, contradictory or analytically false. Instead, that birds are dinosaurs is a perfectly reasonable revisionary taxonomic hypothesis, one that contemporary palaeontologists take seriously. What a palaeontologist who floats this hypothesis is suggesting is that, in order to optimize our classificatory scheme, we should expand our category 'dinosaur' to include birds. I am proposing G=MC in the same spirit.
We have seen some putative cases of metaphysical causation, and addressed some initial objections to G=MC that arise from them. In the next section, we will use our cases to draw out a systematic connection between grounding and counterfactuals.
Metaphysical Dependence Counterfactuals
The simplest counterfactual analysis of causation is the early theory of Lewis 
CF-Euthyphro:
If God had not desired that P, P would not have been good.
CF-Noether:
If the laws of nature had not been symmetric under timetranslation, then energy would not have been a conserved quantity. 13 Lewis's account draws directly on one of Humeʼs ʻtwo definitions of causeʼ (Hume 1748).
14 These examples are posed in the past tense (had not) instead of the present tense (were not to). I think this makes judgments clearer without affecting any substantive issues. should not lead us to conclude that the smashing of the window caused me to throw the brick. Any counterfactual account must deal with this problem of causal asymmetry somehow or other, and no reason has been given to think that successful solutions to the problem will not generalize to the case of metaphysical causation.
The standard way of dealing with the problem of causal asymmetry for counterfactual analyses of causation has been to restrict the analysis so as to associate causal dependence only with a certain class of counterfactuals, a class that does not include the problematic smashing-to-throwing counterfactual. Lewis dubbed the problematic counterfactuals back-trackers, and restricted his analysis (Lewis 1973b (Lewis /1986 ) so that only non-back-tracking counterfactuals were sufficient for causal dependence. In combination with Lewis's proposed semantics for non-back-tracking counterfactuals in terms of 'small miracles' (Lewis 1973a) , this account successfully excludes the most obvious problem cases 17 .
The word 'back-trackingʼ does not properly capture what is wrong with the RCF reverse metaphysical dependence counterfactuals. Unlike the smashing-to-throwing counterfactual, the RCF counterfactuals do not track back in time from the (supposed) cause and then forward again to the (supposed) effect; they instead track down in the 'order of being' from the (supposed) cause and then back up to the (supposed) effect. So we might call them down-trackers, using the collective term wrong-tracker to cover both back-trackers and down-trackers. If G=MC is on the right lines, it suggests that back-tracking and down-tracking are different ways of wrong-tracking, and that there is a unified class of non-wrong-tracking (or righttracking) counterfactuals which sustain genuine relationships of causal dependence.
We can test this hypothesis by considering a curious feature of back-trackers, had not had the best consequences, it would have had to have not been right" seems to introduce a complication that is irrelevant to the thought being expressed.
An adequate counterfactual analysis of causation must provide a natural, informative and non-ad-hoc characterization of right-tracking counterfactuals. In the case of nomological causation, we could try to pick out right-trackers by reference to time variables somehow associated with the antecedent and the consequent; we simply specify that the antecedent-time must be earlier than the consequent-time.
This move is already unattractive in the case of nomological causation, because it rules out causal loops, but it is transparently hopeless in the case of metaphysical causation. We (perhaps!) have a grasp on an eventʼs temporal location that is independent of nomological causal facts about it; we lack any grasp of the level of a fact in the order of being that is independent of grounding facts about it.
Lewis hoped to avoid making the temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence (and hence of causal dependence) into a necessary truth about causation.
Instead, he hoped to exclude back-trackers by appeal to large-scale features of worlds like ours, which he thought would infect back-trackers with widespread indeterminacy (Lewis 1979 (Lewis /1986 even if it were successful in the case of nomological causation (and it is not 18 ), the manoeuvre would not carry over to the case of metaphysical causation. The asymmetry of traces in the actual world, as we have learned from thermal physics, is intimately tied to the monotonic increase in entropy in closed macroscopic systems.
But there is apparently no physical basis for any asymmetry of traces in the metaphysical order of being, no physical quantity which is determined in a lawlike way to be greater for a grounding entity than for the grounded entity. Absent any independent reason to believe reality has the relevant feature, the Lewisian indeterminacy-based manoeuvre does not get off the ground.
One possible response to the difficulties with characterizing right-tracking is to capitulate, and to give up the goal of analyzing causation in non-causal terms. We could characterize the right-tracking counterfactuals as those where the consequent is causally dependent on the antecedent. Any resulting counterfactual theory of causation would then be so uninformative that it could scarcely qualify as an analysis; but perhaps this is the best we can do. Giving up in this way on the project of the counterfactual analysis of causation, and thereby ʻtaking causation as primitiveʼ, would not undermine G=MC. It would not threaten the analogy between grounding and nomological causation emphasized throughout the paper, and it would not vitiate the theoretical benefits of identifying grounding with metaphysical causation set out in §1. However, in the remainder of this paper I will focus on a more ambitious approach to analyzing causation: the interventionist approach associated with Woodward (2003) , Hitchcock (2001), and Pearl (2009) .
Unlike the Lewisian approach, interventionism does not comprise a full reduction of causation to counterfactual dependence, but it is still a form of counterfactual theory since it involves a non-trivial "systematic connection between causal claims and certain counterfactuals" (Woodward 2003, p. 70 Interventionists do not offer any independent characterization of appropriateness;
an appropriate model is just one which correctly captures the causal structure of the situation modelled. This non-reductive approach is of course controversial; my claim is simply that such a move is no less plausible in the case of metaphysical causation than it is in the case of nomological causation. One possible deflationary interpretation of the project of non-reductive analysis reads it as offering not a single non-directed analysis but as offering a disjunction of two analyses; either appropriateness is reductively analysed in terms of causation, or causation is reductively analysed in terms of appropriateness, but the interventionist declines to commit herself to which analysis is correct and commits herself only to the disjunction. This understanding of interventionism is likewise just as applicable to the case of metaphysical causation as it is to the case of nomological causation.
The reliance on appropriate models is key to the way in which interventionists distinguish sufficient causes from contributory causes, and hence to the way in which full grounds will be distinguished from partial grounds in light of G=MC. What is a sufficient cause according to one causal model might be different from what is a sufficient cause according to a more complex causal model that incorporates additional variables. Accordingly, interventionist verdicts both about sufficient causes and about full grounds rely on a judicious choice of appropriate model. There are various attitudes one could take to this situation-one could hold that sufficiency is model-relative and that choice of models is a pragmatic business, or that verdicts of sufficiency are correct only if validated by some 'one true causal model' for the whole of reality, or that a model is appropriate if no inclusion of additional variables undermines the model's verdicts about sufficiency. Since these problems arise just as forcefully for interventionist approaches to nomological causation as they do for interventionist approaches to metaphysical causation, I will set them aside.
The reliance on appropriate models is likewise key to the interventionist response to worries about causal proportionality. Whether CF-Mind/Body is true depends on which model is appropriate, and in particular on whether interventions on the physical state variable in the appropriate model give rise to radically different or merely slightly different physical states. While there is no standard solution to this problem-see Yablo (1992) for discussion and Woodward (2008) for an interventionist treatment of proportionality-we can again set the issue aside for present purposes since it applies with equal force to cases of nomological causation and to cases of metaphysical causation. Any adequate interventionist treatment of proportionality for nomological causation will carry over to an adequate treatment of proportionality for metaphysical causation.
The notion of an intervention does a lot of work for interventionists. It in effect plays the role allotted to small miracles in the Lewisian semantics for right-tracking counterfactuals, the role of specifying that the antecedent be realized in a way which does not 'drag along' unwanted causal history. An intervention is a 'clean' alteration of the value of a particular variable that does not affect the values of upstream causal variables: for example, an intervention on the reading of a barometer leaves unchanged both the pressure in the room and the barometer's own causal origins. It is immediately apparent that interventionism does not offer a reductive theory of causation, since the notion of an intervention is explicitly causal. Nonetheless, interventionists typically maintain that their account is still informative because it shows us how various distinct causal claims are conceptually connected to one another. Interventionism will deliver verdicts about specific causal dependencies once we have specified a causal model, even though there is no algorithm for building causal models which does not itself appeal to causal judgments. By applying the interventionist analysis to grounding construed as metaphysical causation, we might accordingly hope to derive some interesting and informative results about the relation of different grounding claims to one another.
If the non-reductive approach to explicating causation is worthwhile in the case of nomological causation, then it ought also to be worthwhile in the case of metaphysical causation. In the next section, I will show how the approach handles familiar cases of grounding, by exploring a selection of metaphysical causal models.
Metaphysical Causal Models
From an interventionist perspective, the counterfactual dependencies involved in metaphysical causation will be underwritten by a particular metaphysical causal model. This section describes causal models for four kinds of case from the causation literature, offers metaphysical causal models with the same structure, and discusses some interpretive problems that arise.
The metaphysical causal models presented below help us in at least two ways.
Firstly, the models reflect a range of potential patterns of metaphysical causation; this illustrates the flexibility of an approach to grounding based on G=MC.
Secondly, the models correspond to metaphysical versions of well-known puzzle cases My proposed way of distinguishing between types of causation itself makes use of the ideology of causation, by invoking the dependence of a model's structural equations on the mediating principles. However, any circularity here is benign. We are not explaining causation itself in causal terms, but merely using it to help us draw additional, finer-grained, distinctions. We can go on to apply our demarcation criterion to the envisaged dependence of structural equations on mediating principles;
that further dependence will typically be classified as metaphysical causation. and production, and they drove Lewis to deny that causation is a relation at all (Lewis 2004) . Examples of grounding with the same structure are easy to find. Here are two: the set of unicorns is empty because it is not the case that unicorns exist, and the proposition that 1+1=3 is false because it is not the case that 1+1=3. To check for a causal dependency between two variables A and E in symmetric overdetermination cases, we look for some variable B on which we can intervene and hold fixed so as to give rise to a counterfactual dependence of E on A (see Woodward 2003, p.82 for further discussion of interventionist treatments of symmetric overdetermination). However, if one of the overdetermining causes is not represented in the model, then there will be no such variable B that can be held fixed in the antecedent of the model's interventionist counterfactuals. Consequently, no interventionist counterfactual encoded by the model will characterize E as depending on interventions on A, and we obtain the wrong causal verdict. Once again, interventionism here relies on a distinction, which is not reductively analysed, between appropriate and inappropriate causal models of a situation: an appropriate model is one that contains all the relevant causal variables. The interventionist framework is accordingly non-reductive, but (as I argued in the previous section) this feature is no more problematic for the application of interventionism to metaphysical causation than it is for the application of interventionism to nomological causation.
Omission: Unicorns
Variables
In causal pre-emption cases, a potential cause is prevented from taking effect by the triggering of a causal chain leading to the effect via a different route. In the causation literature, it is common to distinguish early pre-emption, where the preempted cause does not occur, from late pre-emption where the pre-empted cause occurs but the causal chain it triggers does not run to completion; here we will only need to consider early pre-emption. In the following typical case of early preemption, Kangarooʼs eating of a tasty shrub is pre-empted by Wombatʼs: 20 This, at least, is the grounding scenario apparently envisaged by defenders of solutions to the problem of the many according to which objects are maximal on any given precisification, as in the view of Lewis (1993) . See also Sider (2001) .
P: Whether the aggressor should be found guilty of murder.
Q: Whether the aggressor unlawfully physically attacked the victim.
R: Whether the aggressor should be found guilty of assault.
E: Whether the aggressor should be found guilty of a crime.
A final type of causal model deserves to be mentioned. The models described above each involve either nomological causation or metaphysical causation, but we can combine the two sorts of causal link to produce ʻmixedʼ causal models that seem quite unproblematic. In the following example, the trajectory of the cricket ball and the rules of cricket conspire to cause the fact that the batsmanʼs team is all out:
Early Pre-emption: Cricket Wicket Variables C: Whether the batsman catches the ball.
P: Whether the batsman should be given out handled the ball.
Q: Whether the ball approaches the wicket.
R: Whether the ball strikes the wicket.
E: Whether the batting team is all out.
These mixed cases provide additional support for G=MC. Where some causal chain includes both grounding and causal links-as when the ball is delivered, strikes the wicket, and the rules determine that the batsman is out-we are unhesitating in our judgment that the delivery of the ball caused the batsman to be out. It is of no consequence to our intuitive judgments that a grounding link is an essential component of the causal chain; and this is just what G=MC would predict.
Impossible Interventions and the Classification of Causation
So far, so good. But a concern has been deferred from §4: the notion of an intervention may well seem problematic in the grounding context. A similar strategy can be used to classify different varieties of metaphysical causation. Perhaps logical grounding is a type of causation mediated by logical laws or valid rules of inference; perhaps mereological grounding is a type of causation mediated by laws of mereology; perhaps set-theoretic grounding is a type of causation mediated by axioms of set theory. I have only been able to sketch the resulting classification scheme here, but I hope that this sketch still goes some way towards illustrating the potential theoretical fruitfulness of G=MC.
Conclusion
We are now in a position to draw together the various strings of the groundingphysical causation analogy and to sum up the overall case for G=MC. Grounding and nomological causation are alike in the following respects:  A generalized interventionist approach can be applied to both notions, providing in each case an account which is non-reductive but potentially still informative and which handles the main puzzle cases. ( §5)
My case for G=MC rests upon this systematic analogy, upon the benefits of G=MC (described in §1) with respect to ideological parsimony and to the groundingexplanation connection, and upon the coherence of mixed causal models ( §5). G=MC makes sense of how we understand and assess grounding claims, and of the role they play in our metaphysical theorizing. When combined with an interventionist approach to causation and with a semantics for interventionist counterfactuals which allows for non-trivial counterpossible truth and falsity, G=MC delivers sensible verdicts over a wide variety of cases.
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